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In the words of Chen Tao, 2012 was a watershed year during which thepolitical and public spotlight turned from concerns about GDP andgrowth to focus more on the redistribution of wealth. Articles by Chinese
researchers, journalists, and academics have also broadly addressed the twin
subjects of sustainable growth and quality of development. The question
of fair income distribution holds an important place in all of them. Discus-
sion of this matter has been given a new lease of life by the publication of
the first official Gini index since 2008, which, according to the National Bu-
reau of Statistics (NBS), dropped from 0.49 in 2008 to 0.47 in 2012, and
through the launch of a “reform plan for income distribution” (shouru fenpei
gaige fang’an 收入分配改革方案), put before the National People’s Congress
in March. 
The writers recognise the extent of efforts carried out by the government,
and note the importance, symbolically at least, of the measures announced
in the redistribution plan. They all confirm that it was high time for the gov-
ernment to tackle the issue of inequality, as strong growth without equi-
table redistribution will be increasingly difficult to justify in the future, and
potentially fraught with social risks.
However, a number of criticisms have quickly appeared: Beijing’s figures
are said to be unrealistic, as is the proposed programme itself. What is
the reality of social, economic, and territorial inequality in China? What
does the action plan provide for, and if it is inadequate, what are its weak-
nesses?
The scope and details of income disparity in
China 
There is little data available for measuring income disparity in China, and
even when it does exist it is not always consistent. In this context, the Gini
coefficient (ji’nixishu 基尼系数) is doubtless the “least bad” tool for com-
prehending these inequalities. According to the latest official figures (from
the NBS), in China, the Gini coefficient stood at 0.474 (5) in 2012. Despite
being high – the world average is 0.44 – this result is contradicted by several
sources. Indeed, in 2010, the UN published its own calculation of the Chi-
nese index and obtained a ratio of around 0.52. 
That same year, the Survey and Research Centre for Household Finance
in Southwest China, headed by Gan Li, also published a study on the subject,
the Chinese Households Financial Survey (CHFS). According to this report,
the country’s Gini coefficient was probably closer to 0.61. This body broke
the ratio down into 0.56 for urban households and 0.60 for rural households.
It also appears from this study that the main source of income inequality
in China is disparity in salaries. In urban areas, 53% of income inequality
comes from differences in salary; in the countryside the Gini index is made
up of 33% for the industrial sector and 22% for agriculture. The CHFS also
shows that the more a region is developed and its economy liberalised, the
more marked the gaps are. The study showed the 2010 Gini coefficient to
be 0.59 in the east of the country, 0.57 in the centre, and 0.55 in the west.
Gan Li is very sceptical about whether disparities decreased in China be-
tween 2010 and 2012, and hence about the proportions referred to in these
two studies. Gan Li speculates that these divergences stem in particular
from the fact that over the past ten years, the NBS figures have only taken
rural households into account.
In spite of divergences in the conclusions drawn by the three sources, they
all put China above the international average, and show the real nature of
the problem of income distribution in the country. The figures put forward
by Gan Li even place China among the most unequal countries in the world.
In his view, whilst it is normal for a country going through a rapid growth
phase to have a high Gini index, a value of 0.61 is exceptionally high.
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1. Director of the Survey and Research Centre for Household Finance in Southwest China.
2. Professor at the Guanghua School of Management, Peking University.
3. Economics journalist, Nanfang zhoumo.
4. Feng Lei and Qiu Yue are both journalists for Guangming ribao.
5. Figures provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), cited by Feng Lei and Qiu Yue.
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Reducing Inequality: Taking from the
top to distribute at the bottom
Analysis by Agatha Kratz based on the following sources:
– Gan Li, (1) “缩减收入差距” (Reducing income disparity), Caijing, 6 January 2013.
– Zhu Guozhong, (2) “‘二次分配’难奏效” (The ‘second distribution’ struggles to deliver), Caijing, 6 January 2013.
– Chen Tao, (3) “什么在影响中国人未来的收入” (What will influence the future incomes of the Chinese?), Nanfang zhoumo, 3 January 2013.
– Feng Lei and Qiu Yue, (4) “收入分配改革警惕四大误区” (The four mistakes of the reform in income distribution), Guangming ribao, 
28 January 2013.
– Editorial, “跳出分配看收入分配改革” (Getting away from the concept of redistribution to look at the reform of redistribution), 
Diyi caijing ribao, 19 December 2012.
The introduction of government measures
The Chinese government, aware of the risk of social, economic, and polit-
ical tensions associated with such income disparity, launched discussion in
2012 as to how to rebalance the spatial and social distribution of income
in China. The upshot of this initiative took the form of an action plan for re-
form of distribution, which was put before the National People’s Congress
in March.
Zhu Guozhong observes that this reform had already been under discus-
sion (in other forms) for the better part of eight years. The extent of the
problem, its controversial nature, the strong resistance in some circles, and
the many delays and postponements in the debate account for the excep-
tionally long process. During the same period, however, public interest con-
tinued to grow to the point that a large portion of the population is now
palpably impatient for concrete measures.
Even before its publication, (6) the action plan had already been subject to
numerous criticisms, especially by the writers referred to here. One encour-
aging point, however, as Zhu Guozhong concedes, is the fact that the gov-
ernment has finally resolved to “take from the rich to give to the poor”
(jiefujipin 劫富济贫). In order to carry this out, the plan provides for fiscal
reform (and in particular an increase in taxation of the well-off), and a
growth in financial transfers to low-income sections of the population. That
will not be enough, however, to solve the many problems related to income
inequality in China.
The inadequacies of the redistribution law
Firstly, the economic authorities have not made clear what the principal
source of the new fiscal revenue would be. Even if, in theory, these contri-
butions should come from the high-income bracket, Zhu Guozhong is con-
cerned by the fact that these are often the very people with power,
connections, and influence and that they could use these levers to avoid
paying the new levies. This would mean that the burden of the reform would
fall on the middle classes, who earn enough to be taxed more but who do
not have enough influence to avoid new taxes. Zhu Guozhong explains that
the government runs the risk of “fleecing the middle class” zhongchanjieji
bei jian yangmao 中产阶级被剪了羊毛) or “milking the middle classes to
save the poor” (sougua zhongceng jieji diceng 搜刮中层接济底层). The
writer adds that while the middle class will gradually become “lean and
weak” (shouruo 瘦弱), the “cake” (dangao蛋糕) of the rich will continue to
get bigger. This measure will therefore not settle the problem of inequality,
since it will be felt especially by the middle classes whilst largely sparing
high-income earners.
Furthermore, the tax hike will have at least two perverse effects. The one
will be to reduce investment by tying up important resources, and the other
will be to reduce the purchasing power of the middle classes, which flies in
the face of the government’s objective of promoting domestic consump-
tion.
Finally, Zhu Guozhong’s main regret concerns the little importance that
this reform gives to the concept of economic opportunity, at least as he
sees it. He paints a picture of Chinese society as a pyramid, at the top of
which are the well-to-do, relying on their networks and their influence, en-
joying privileges and the majority of economic opportunities. The middle
classes have to rely on their abilities and qualifications, sometimes manag-
ing to seize the odd opportunity that comes their way. The less well-off por-
tion of the population has no access to economic opportunities and is
trapped in poverty. Zhu goes on to say that state monopolies and corruption
only serve to exacerbate these inequalities of opportunity.
Solutions and improvements proposed by
the writers
The writers propose a certain number of adjustments to the government
action plan.
Feng Lei and Qiu Yue refer to Zheng Bingwen, the Director for the Centre
for International Social Security in the Academy of Social Sciences, who be-
lieves that it should be left to the market place to ensure the optimal allo-
cation of resources. If market mechanisms were more efficient in China,
with fewer distortions, economic opportunities would increase and bring
about an increase in income for the poorest portion of the population.
The Diyi caijing ribao editorial reminds us that remedying income disparity
in China is a long-haul task. Even if direct redistribution is an effective short-
term solution in that it gives some comfort to families in need, it will take
more than a fiscal reform to settle the problem of disparity between the
cities and the rural areas. To achieve this, the state will have to use devel-
opment as its main tool, and in particular will have to strive relentlessly for
economic catch-up by giving greater access to those who have lacked it.
By relying on the “cake” of the richest regions, the government will be able
to put in place a series of measures promoting economic activity in the dis-
advantaged regions.
Gan Li proposes that direct redistribution and an increase in the basic
wage should not be the focus, as these introduce distortions and affect low-
income earners by limiting the hiring of new labour. In his view, methods of
secondary redistribution such as improving public services, widening the
social security net, and increasing “transfers” (zhuanyizhifu 转移支付) and
social benefits are more effective levers. Liberalising public enterprises and
monopolies, etc., should also be encouraged. Lastly, over the long term, in-
vestment in education will play a major role in promoting equality of op-
portunity and ensuring less inequality in levels of income.
Gan Li insists on the need to develop China’s social security system. He
takes the view that a “perfect social insurance system” (wanshan shebao
xitong 完善社保体系) can markedly reduce the perverse effects of income
inequality. This system is still very under-developed in today’s China,
where the 2011 social security outlay represented only 12.3% of public
expenditure (taking into account China’s Social Insurance Fund), as against
36.6% in the United States. Gan Li informs us that public assistance to
households in need is also inadequate. In 2010, 71% of households living
below the standard poverty line of $1.25 a day received no help from the
government. Support is also lacking for the aged. According to the same
CHFS report, in 2010, 45% of retirees received no pension or other help
from the state. Furthermore, only 30% of retrenched workers had a right
to unemployment benefits. Lastly, although China’s health insurance
scheme is very broad, covering a large part of the population, it remains
too weak and uneven, with major discrepancies in access to the particular
disadvantage of the rural population. Harmonising cover between urban
and rural areas would already enable a reduction in post-redistribution in-
come disparity.
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6. The articles quoted here were published before the publication of the Plan, and even before it
was presented to the National People’s Congress.
Urbanisation and pollution
“Haze” has recently become one of the most popular words inChina. What immediately springs to mind is the exceptionallyhigh levels of pollution recorded in Beijing, which, at the height
of the phenomenon (at the time of the articles cited), was an unprecedented
886 micrograms per cubic meter, (3) according to the US Embassy’s obser-
vation stations for air quality.
Yi Peng sees several causes for the recent blanket haze over the Bei-
jing-Tianjin-Hebei region. First, in the worst days of this “air-pocalypse”
(kongqi mori 空气末日, to quote the expression used by the press), an
absence of cold air currents and wind was a very important factor. The
lack of natural ventilation caused a strong concentration of pollutants in
the atmosphere, at a relatively stable level, and did not allow for their
dispersal. He also points to other factors, particularly pollution from
motor vehicles, industrial output, and high-density population, as well as
the energy needs of buildings. These ancillary factors, which are also of
major importance, are all more or less connected to urbanisation. This
leads our writers to rethink China’s current urban planning models. For Yi
Peng, Beijing has to become the symbol of a new way of thinking about
urban development.
What solutions?
The Chinese capital has, according to Yi Peng, the highest level of public
services in the country. Due to this abundance of administrative resources,
the city is host to a population approaching 20 million and, according to
the writer, could one day be home to nearly 50 million residents. Although
Beijing is probably in a position to accommodate a population of that size
in terms of services, financial means, or on account of its size, the appear-
ance of intense haze over the past few months is an important signal that
raises the question of whether Beijing can really sustain such a level of ur-
banisation and whether the city can really continue to grow.
These questions concern all major Chinese cities and make us wonder
about their potential for future growth and whether they will be capable of
resisting the enormous environmental pressures related to urbanisation. 
In the words of Yi Peng, in order to avoid having mega-cities like Shanghai
or Beijing “hit the wall” (qu chu bi 去触壁), a planned approach will be re-
The Chinese government has the financial
means to carry out these reforms, but does
it have the courage to implement them?
Simple solutions for reducing inequalities in China do therefore exist. All they
require, according to Gan Li, is a small increase in public expenditure and taxation. 
China today has the financial resources to implement effective measures
to reduce income inequality. The writer states that the 2011 gross public
income was in the vicinity of 10,000 billion yuan, 2,000 billion of which
could easily be released to finance these reforms. This windfall corresponds
roughly to the profit level of public enterprises, which pay only 2% of their
revenue to the state.
According to Gan Li, a “reasonable” policy would already have spectacular
results. By redistributing – directly or indirectly – to 60% of the poorest
families, the government could bring the Gini coefficient down from 0.6 to
0.4 according to the CHFS’s figures.
However, as the editorial in the Diyi caijing ribao reminds us, this re-
form will be difficult to implement, as it requires “lifting the bottom
(tidi 提低), broadening the middle (kuozhong 扩中), and putting a cap
on the top (konggao 控高)” of the social pyramid. In order to reduce in-
equality in China, what will be required therefore is a complete overhaul
of the country’s economic structure by questioning the privileges of the
well-to-do and sharing their “cake” with the middle classes and the dis-
advantaged.
This same editorial stresses that reducing disparity would need a
change of “system” (xitong 系统), implying that income reform is one
component in the general reform of China’s economic system. If imple-
mented, this reform will challenge a number of vested interests. In the
past, such reforms were often embarked upon and then encountered re-
sistance from interest groups. Often too, such plans “ended up being left
by the wayside” (zuihou zhihao buliaoliaozhi 最后只好不了了之). In the
view of these editorial writers, the government will therefore have to
show not only “courage and political wisdom” (zhengzhi yongqi he zhi-
hui 政治勇气和智慧), but above all “determination” (juexin 决心).
z Translated by Peter Brown.
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1. Researcher in the Research Centre on Human Resources at the Peking University and editorialist
for several economic newspapers, such as the Chinese version of the Financial Times, Zhongguo
jingying bao, Jingji guancha bao, etc.
2. Journalist for Zhongguo kexue bao.
3. Average hourly concentration is PM 2.5 in the atmosphere.
Current affairs
No Administrative Solution in Sight
for Urban “Air-pocalypse”
Analysis by Giulia C. Romano based on the following sources:
– Yi Peng, (1) “雾霾对城镇化的影响” (The influence of haze on urban development), Caixin, 19 February 2013.
– He Chunlu, (2) “‘毒空气’凸显中国式低碳治理困境” (‘Poisoned air’ underlines the difficulties in the Chinese approach to low carbon man-
agement), Zhongguo kexue bao, 16 January 2013.
